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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
All parties to the proceeding are included in the front page caption. ln addition to 
counsel listed in the caption, Mr. Barrett was represented at the Screening Panel by Erik 
Strindberg, and at trial by George M . Hal ey and J. Andrew Sjoblom. Robert K. Hi lder bas 
been Mr. Barrett's sole counsel during the appeal. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over tl1i matter pursuant to the Utah 
Constitution, Article Vlll, Section 4 and Utah Code A1motated §78A-3-102(3)(c) 
(explicitly setting forth the Court's ap pellate jurisdiction over discipline of lawyers) . 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: The trial cou rt s fi ndings of fact are clearly erroneous. A ppellee/Cross-
Appellant, Joseph P. Barrett ("Barrett") did not violate Rule 8.4(c), Utah Rules of 
Profess ional Conduct. 
Determinative Law: Rule 8.4(c) Utah Rules of Profess ional Conduct 
Standard of Review: Because the Utah Supreme Court has exclusive and plenary 
jurisdiction over all matters involving members of the Utah State Bar, it alone may 
determine the law to apply in attorney discipline matters. The Supreme Cou rts authori ty 
is derived from artic le VUI ection 4 of the Utah Constitution. In the Matter of the 
Discipline of Ray Harding, Jr. 2004 UT 100, ~112, 104 P.3d 1220. 
Specifically applying the Court's exclusive and plenary jurisdiction to its review 
of factual findin gs by a district court the Cou rt "employs a unique standard of rev iew. 1JL 
re Discipline of Corey 2012 UT 21, ii 23 n. l 3 274 P.3d 972. "While we will 'ordinari ly 
presume findings of fact to be correct and will not overturn them unless they are 
arbih·ary, capricious, or plainly in rror, we accord them les deference in matter or 
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attorney discipline.' lei . And, "we reserve the right to draw inferences from basic facts 
wh ich may differ from the inferences drawn by the lower tr ibunal." lei. 
Is ue 2: Whether the trial court 's determinations of rul e violations resu lted from 
bias, prejudice or misconduct on the part of the district court. 
Determinative Law: Rule 2.9(C) Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 
Standard of Review: Because the Utah Supreme Court has exclus ive and plenary 
jurisdiction over all matters invo lving members of the Utah State Bar, it alone may 
detennine the law to apply in attorney discipline matters . The Supreme Court's authority 
is derived from article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution. 1n the Matter of the 
Discipline of Ray Harding, Jr. 2004 UT 100, i112, 104 P.3d 1220. 
"Whil e we wi ll ordinar ily presume [the di stri ct court's] find ings of fact to be 
correct and will not overturn them unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in 
enor, we accord them less deference in matters of attorney discipline.' ln re Discipline of 
Corey, 20 12 UT 21, ii 23 n. 13,274 P. Jd 972 (i nternal quotation marks omitt d). And, 
"we rese rve the right to draw inferences from basic facts which may differ from the 
inferences drawn by the [ district court]." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Ultimately, " [a] s to the discipline actually imposed , our constitutional responsibility 
requires us to make an independent determination as to its correctn ss." In re Discipline 
of Crawley, 2007 UT 44, ii 17 J 64 P. 3d 1232 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Issue 3: The OPC demand for disbarment is neither warranted nor required by 
Utah's lawyer discipline rules or Mr. Barrett's conduct. 
Determinative Law: Rules l 4-604 through l 4-607 , Standards for 1 mposi ng 
Lawyer Sanctions; Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 4. 
Standard of Review: Ultimately, "[a]s to the discipline actually imposed, our 
constitutional responsibility requires us to make an independent determination as to its 
correct11ess." In re Discipline of Crawley, 2007 UT 44, ii 17, 164 P.3d 1232 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In the Matter of Jonathan Grimes, 2012 UT 87, ~112. In matters 
of attorney discipline, we review 'findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard,' 
whi le ' reserv[ing] the right to draw different inferences.' But when we review the 
sanction imposed, our constitutional responsibility requires us to make an independent 
determination as to its correctness." ln the M atter of the Discipline of Franklin Richard 
Brussow, 2012 UT 53 , i J1 3. 
CITATION OF ISSUES PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
Issues 1 and 2, were preserved in Barrett's hearing brief, opening statements at the 
vio lation hearing, closing arguments , and in a post hearing Motion to Amend Findings. 
Issue 3 was preserved in Barrett's hearing brief, opening statement and closing 
arguments. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, AND STATUTES 
Utah Constitutional Provision 
Utah Constitution, Article Vlll, Section 4. 
7 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4( c) (text of Rule as provided in OPC brief) 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (text of Rules as prov ided in OPC brief) 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, Rules 14-60 1 through 14-607 (text of 
Standards as provided in OPC brie-1) 
Judicial Code of Conduct, Ru le 2.9 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this attorney discipline case, the district court ordered that Appellee/Cross-
Appellant, Joseph P. Barrett, shall be suspended for 150 days for violation of Rule 8.4(c) , 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The OPC appealed the sanctions imposed by the 
trial court. Appellee/Cross-Appellant appeals both the violation finding and the sanction. 
The trial court stayed imposition of the suspension , pending appeal. 
Course of Proceedings 
Following a Screening Panel Hearing of an Amended Notice of Informal 
Complaint, dated February 15, 2013, the Panel directed the OPC to file a formal 
complaint in the district court, Case # I 30907818, asserting three alleged violations of 
Rule 8.4(c). On January 27, 2015, the Honorable Robert P. Faust conducted an 
adjudication trial. On February 11, 2015 the court issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, wherein the court determined that Barrett bad violated Rule 8.4(c) 
as alleged by the OPC. A sanctions hearing was held on March 2, 2015 during which 
OPC argued for disbarment, but failed to present any witnesses or evidence in support. 
The following day, March 3, 2015, Judge Faust issued an Order of Suspension , ordering 
that Barrett be suspended for 150 days , effective 30 days from the date of the Order. 
Within forty-eight ( 48) hours the OPC appea led, on the sole grounds that the presumpti ve 
discipline is disbarment. Barrett filed his cross-appeal on March 19, 2015. 
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Statement of Facts 
In January 2012, Appellee/Cross-Appellant Joseph P. Banett, a shareholder in the 
Salt Lake City law firm, Snow Christensen & Martineau ("SCM"), confronted and 
offended the finn president, Andrew Morse (inconectly identified through the trial court 
proceedings and transcripts as Andrew "Morris"). The details of the dispute illustrate the 
personal nature of these proceedings. Mr. Banett accused Mr. Morse of client poaching 
and misrepresentations to one ofBanett's clients and challenged his leadership of the 
firm. Upon being confronted, Mr. Morse raised his voice and called Mr. Banett "stupid," 
or perhaps worse. [Tr. 85-86, 180, R. 525] Within six weeks (February 24, 2012), Banett 
was called to a meeting with Morse, firm chairman, David Slaughter, and an employment 
lawyer. Morse produced a sheaf of old expense reimbursement forms submitted by 
Banett, and proceeded to question Barrett about details of meetings, lunches and travel, 
among other expense claims. Not one of the allegations on which the OPC ultimately 
proceeded was identified at the meeting [Tr. 86-87, R. 525], but the tone and course was 
set. SCM and Morse claimed Banett had in some way enriched himself through expense 
reimbursement-for both case expenses, and business development-and ultimately, two 
claims alleging improper trading of legal services for construction work at Banett's 
residence emerged. By the end of the meeting, Barrett was given a choice-resign or be 
terminated as a partner. Confronted with this Robson's choice, Banett resigned. He was 
immediately handed checks for severance and a final pay check, but his shareholder 
equity was not addressed at that time. 
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In sh01i, no client or any member of any profession has ever raised concerns over 
BaITett's conduct - all allegations of misconduct were founded on allegations by his 
fo1mer partner that Banett breached internal SCM policies and procedures. The 
allegations are addressed below. 
In time, and after many allegations were launched against Banett through the 
OPC, the Infom1al OPC procedure commenced with just four allegations, and reduced to 
three two days later, after OPC staff interviewed a key witness regarding one complaint 
of improper request for reimbursement of a business development expense (the China 
trip). Following that interview, OPC staff determined the allegation at issue was without 
basis, and the NOIC was amended on February 15, 2013, to include just the three cunent 
allegations. 
For purposes of the proceedings in this matter, those three allegations are 
identified as (1) the Williams' Matter, (2) the Petersen Matter, and (3) the L.A. (or 
California) Lunch. The Williams and Petersen matters both concern BaITett's interactions 
with two clients, general contractor David Petersen and his subcontractor Dick Williams, 
with whom Banett had longstanding relationships as construction contr·actors at his 
residence. Both Petersen and Williams signed proper SCM engagement letters and paid 
retainers, which were appropriately deposited with SCM [Tr. 185, R. 525]. Even so, 
Barrett is accused of specifically agreeing to trade legal services for construction 
services. The trial court entered findings of fact that such agreements existed. Barrett 
denies any such agreements , and the accuracy of the findings is addressed below, but 
I I 
Ban-ett agrees that both Williams and Petersen worked on his house, and he transparently 
requested that SCM write down most all of his legal billings for his work on behalf of 
both men for legitimate marketing purposes consistent with SCM film culture. 
The remaining allegation is that Banett claimed reimbursement for a lunch in Los 
Angeles, attended by Barrett's wife, and a potential client, when Banett was not 
physically present. The bill was $123.54, and the incident is frankly admitted - but any 
deceitful inference is contested herein. Barrett discussed a legal matter by phone with the 
guest for 15 to 20 minutes, and he told his wife to not allow this potential client to buy 
her own lunch. [Tr. 35-42, R. 525] Mr. Barrett never tried to hide what he was doing. His 
reimbursement request was accompanied by an AMEX receipt showing a charge for 
$123.54 at a restaurant in Los Angeles, and Barrett's SCM time entries and finn billing 
reports for the same time clearly showed he was in Utah . Andrew Morse, SCM and OPC 
never gave Barrett a chance to explain that lunch. Barrett's SCM Shareholder Agreement 
expressly permitted reimbursement for meals when promoting the fim1. Yet, Morse did 
not ask Barrett or his wife or the potential client whether Barrett promoted the firm on the 
phone, and during the lunch. [Tr. 176, R. 525] Morse admitted that there was no 
oversight of reimbursement claims ( even though executive committee members signed 
off on requests, including Barrett's), "policies were honored in the breach and there was 
not any kind of discipline or even loose review ... [for] reimbursing a lawyer for 
business development purposes." [Tr. 162-163, R. 525] 
Morse concluded that the expense could not be legitimate, because Banett was 
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not physically present and the business development lunch was "with a person who is not 
a client of the firm." [Tr. 167, R. 525] Morse was forthright in his admission that he 
never asked Barrett to explain the L.A. Lunch, or another business development expense 
[Tr. 79, R. 525], "Because I didn't need to ask him. We drew the conclusion, just looking 
at six weeks of reimbursement records, that they were fraught with misrepresentations, 
fraudulent statements, and he was stealing from us. So we fired him." [Tr. 182, R. 525] 
There followed a continuing dispute regarding whether SCM would pay Mr. 
Barrett for his equity interest in the firm-about $26,000.00 plus $6,000.00 in 
shareholder distributions for early 2012. Before that dispute was resolved, Mr. Morse, 
acting personally as complainant, submitted an unverified Complaint to the Office of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar ("OPC") concerning Mr. Banett's expense 
reports. The unverified repmi was submitted on May 7, 2012. Mr. Morse did not verify 
the report until June 19, 2012, when it was clear that Mr. Banett would not at that time 
accede to an offset against his equity interest in an amount almost equal to the sum SCM 
owed Mr. Banett. 
Not one of the claimed improper reimbursements for 2009 through 2011 was 
ultimately pursued by the OPC. On December 13, 2012, after months of extensive OPC 
investigation including the exchange of hundreds of pages of written submissions, OPC 
Deputy Senior Counsel Todd Wahlquist sent a letter to Mr. Morse stating that his 
complaint reflected, "a dispute among former pruiners about whether certain expenses 
were properly reimbursed." (Ltr. from Wahlquist to Morse at 2, Dec. 13, 2012). [R. 33] 
13 
Mr. Wahlquist opined that, "those responsible for reviewing client expenses, 
write-offs, and reimbursements did not set limits on what the firm would allow and what 
it would not." [R. 31] Further, "[ t]he fim1' s practice of not requiring more information 
from someone seeking reimbursement makes it difficult for the OPC to establish that the 
person was being dishonest or deceitful." [R. 33] 
Mr. Wahlquist concluded that this type of dispute does not implicate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, and that OPC " ... cannot inse1t ourselves into a dispute among 
former partners about whether ce1iain expenses were properly reimbursed." [R. 32-33] 
Nonetheless, Morse continued his personal assault on Mr. Barrett. On the same 
day OPC sent the December 13, 2012 letter, Mr. Morse submitted additional allegations 
against Mr. Ba1Tett to OPC, alleging for the first time that Mr. Banett engaged in deals 
for legal services in exchange for construction work at his house. Those allegations 
consumed most of the trial court proceedings, and will be addressed below with citation 
to the record. Mr. Morse testified that he learned of these alleged deals when one of the 
contractors (Petersen) lamented his mistreatment by Mr. Banett to another lawyer at 
SCM (Tr. 169-170, R. 525). Later, that same conh·actor testified that he still refers cases 
to Mr. Barrett (Tr. 157, R.525). It appears that the genesis of these newly discovered 
contractor allegations may very well be the personal animus towards Mr. Ba1Tett by Mr. 
Morse arising from the Cottonwood Heights dispute. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Clearly Erroneous and 
Compromised By Misconduct, Bias or Prejudice 
Joseph Barrett did not enter into any trade agreements with contractors who 
worked on his home over several years. Mr. Barrett very actively engaged in business 
development consistent with the strong priorities and encouragement of his law firm as 
stated in the SCM Compensation Policy (Exhibit C to Respondent's Admitted Exhibit 
62). Barrett enjoys people of all types, and consistent with his blue collar upbringing, he 
enjoys associating with contractors, construction workers and similar people. Many 
clients come from these occupations. There are three allegations in this case. Two involve 
construction contractors who have also been clients and referral sources for Mr. Barrett. 
The third allegation involves a dispute about whether reimbursement for a lunch that cost 
$123.54 was a legitimate business development expense. It is submitted that the 
explanation of that matter in this brief will likely lead to its dismissal. Discussion 
therefore rehnns to the alleged trade for services between Barrett and Dick Williams, and 
Barrett and Dave Petersen. 
There are some common threads with these allegations. Both involve 
contractors with whom Barrett had a prior relationship. Both involve contractors who are 
also fathers, and both men have found themselves in sihrntions where they needed help 
with their boys. Mr. Petersen's ex-wife decided to move the parties' son to Hawaii, 
drastically reducing Petersen's contact with his boy. He turned to Joseph Barrett to help 
15 
with a custody modification. Joseph cannot refuse requests for such personal needs. Dick 
Williams has a son who has sometimes worked with his father in Joseph's yard. Sadly, 
this young man became involved in drugs, and was charged with a felony. Dick 
desperately needed help. BatTett jumped right in, and within several months, he was able 
to get Williams' boy into drug comi, avoid the felony charge, and see great improvement. 
Williams and Petersen are alike in another way. Neither has much money, and 
they cannot really afford lawyers. Barrett knew this. He knew he would probably never 
be paid, but he would not tum them away. Both cases were resolved. Ba1Tett did what his 
firm expects, and billed his time as the cases proceeded, but as he expected, the clients 
could not really pay. One paid a few hundred dollars, the other nothing. Ba1Tett did the 
logical and transpai·ent thing-he requested that his time be written off, the request was 
approved, and the balances were eliminated. All this occuned before both contractors 
became involved in more work at Barrett's home, and at different times both made 
proposals to do work either free or at reasonable rates for Ba1Tett. These were not trades, 
they were not payment for work, but Mr. Barrett has ce1iainly come to understand that he 
should have put 2 and 2 together, recognized that what was happening could be 
misconstrued, and he should have infonned his firm of these developments. That is the 
history, except for one more event-about this same time, Barrett got seriously cross-
ways with the firm president, Andrew Morse-and nothing was the same after that. 
Ultimately, there was a trial. It did not go well for Mr. Banett. While very 
disappointed in the findings of misconduct, Banett has come to see that he really could 
16 
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and should have handled the events differently-but he was not deceitful, dishonest or 
fraudulent. He did not misrepresent anything. But the findings exist, and they must be 
challenged. 
Mr. Barrett does not suggest that the trial judge set out to compromise his 
findings, but that has occuned for a number of clearly discernible reasons. The first 
misstep that leads to error is the com1's characterization of so-called stipulated facts that 
were not, in fact stipulated. "Stipulated" facts 33 and 52 were not stipulated, and both 
were challenged when the court issued its Findings of Fact characterizing them as 
stipulated. A timely post-hearing motion to amend findings was filed after the court 
issued its findings. [R. 382-387] OPC counsel opposed the Motion, and it was not ruled 
upon fonnally. The issue was addressed at the beginning of the sanctions hearing, with 
the very unsatisfactory result that the court adopted OPC's suggestion that the court 
simply move the not-really-stipulated findings, 33 and 52, to its adjudicated findings 
section. That one decision seriously undermines the confidence with which other findings 
can be viewed. 
The imp011ance of this enor cannot be overstated; it is a crucial and prejudicial 
step off the path of accurate fact finding. The error in the findings is crucial. Number 33 
states: "The Firm was unaware that Mr. Williams paid $3,500.00 directly to Mr. Banett 
for legal services." ( emphasis added). There could not have been a fact more in dispute 
than the phrase highlighted-"for legal services." Mr. Barrett never understood that to be 
17 
the case, and careful review of the testimony falls far short of establishing that point by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
As will be shown in detail below, the court's apparent belief that this fact was 
not in dispute almost certainly led the corni into enor. With this one counterfeit stipulated 
phrase, Judge Faust was primed to launch his adjudicated facts, with the statement that he 
did not give much weight to the testimony of Mr. Banett. [Finding No. 39 - Record 369]. 
Indeed, what judge would give weight to a witness who seems to be testifying in direct 
contravention of what he apparently stipulated to. This error would almost certainly be 
fatal if this was not a lawyer discipline case, where this Court comes prepared to consider 
clearly erroneous findings as part of its unique role under the Utah Constih1tion. All 
experienced judges understand that an adverse comment as to the credibility of a witness 
almost always inoculates findings unfavorable to that witness from meaningful appellate 
review. After all, the trial judge was uniquely situated to consider and weigh the 
credibility of the testimony. This Cornt is asked to look anew at the testimony on the 
issue of a meeting of the minds on an agreement to trade services, without the distortion 
created by a fact that was not stipulated, and which creates prejudicial confusion. 
Finding No. 52, also not stipulated, was not as obviously damaging, but it was a 
serious red hening. The finding, "Initially, it was anticipated that a shed would be built 
for approximately $5,000," is not true, at least in Mr. Barrett's mind. There is evidence 
that could support a number of findings, one of which is that $5,000 was the set price, not 
an approximation. Banett indeed paid $5,000. The evidence of Petersen on this point is 
18 
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confusing at best. Banett's evidence is consistent. For example, Petersen agrees that he 
probably did tell Mr. Barrett that this was a shed that "you could just bang out in a week 
or so." [Tr. 140-141] It is also informative that Mr. Petersen in fact incuned costs of 
about $8,700, far below alternate claims of about $16,000, and two years later, more than 
$23,000. [Tr. 141] 
One additional point shows why the Court must seriously consider the 
problems caused by the enoneously styled stipulated facts, and by clearly enoneous or 
otherwise deficient factual findings by the trial court. That is, the question of the alleged 
agreements to trade services is at the heart of any determination that, in tum, will likely 
drive the Court's sanction decision. 
The Court will discover numerous errors in findings. For example, the Court 
will see below that there are only two facts found by the trial judge in support of his 
conclusion that the lunch expenditure was a violation of Rule 8.4(c), that violation 
finding cannot stand. The first Finding, No. 87, is favorable to Mr. Ban-ett. The second, 
Finding, No. 88, is utterly without support in the record. If this Court agrees, the alleged 
improper meal reimbursement must be dismissed, and the alleged trades for services are 
the sole bases for any possible discipline. 
The Appropriate Sanction 
The OPC has pursued disbarment in this case with a zeal that is hard to explain. 
Counsel argued repeatedly in the trial court that disbarment is the presumptive sanction 
for misappropriation, regardless whether or not a client's funds are at issue, but to do so it 
19 
stretches the rules and definitions supporting presumptive disbarment beyond 
recognition. This is not a presumptive disbaiment case under Utah law. The first and 
most critical reason is that Barrett did not engage in misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, but the district comt found a violation of Rule 8 .4( c ). 
Even if this Court affirms the violation determination, this is not a disbarment 
case. There is no suggestion of misappropriation of client funds. Regardless, OPC 
counsel nevertheless argued disbarment strenuously in the trial court, where counsel in 
fact conceded that, based on the court's findings, there was no presumptive argument 
under either sub-part (a) (1) or (a) (2) of Rule 14-605, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. Ultimately, OPC counsel argued, 
[T]he Court fow1d [violation of Rule] 8.4(c), which isn't in provision one, 
therefore disbarment is not the presumptive sanction under the section. And that's 
fine. Same with section two; the Court didn't make a finding of criminal conduct. 
The issue is three, whether or not this seriously adversely reflects on his fitness to 
practice law. 
[Tr. 50, R. 525] 
Of course, in the OPC's brief, 8.4(c)(a)(l) is resun-ected. Nevertheless, the 
argument is no stronger than it was when Mr. Wahlquist conceded in closing that Rule 
14-605(a)(l) does not apply to Rule 8.4(c) violations. Even in light of the findings of fact 
that Mr. Ban-ett challenges in this appeal, the trial court did not supply a factual 
foundation sufficient to support disbarment. 
The foregoing paragraph frames the issue if this Court does not reject or 
substantially amend the findings of fact and ultimate conclusions oflaw on which OPC's 
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recommendations are based. Mr. Barrett submits that he will show in this brief that this 
Court should use the hearing transcripts and admitted evidence as the basis to craft its 
own findings and conclusions, and from that point, should the Court find misconduct that 
fits the sole Rule of which Barrett has notice, the Court should fashion a sanction 
consistent with the conduct and the standards for imposing discipline. Mr. Barrett 
respectfully submits his arguments regarding sanctions at Point III below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Mr. Barrett understands the burden he assumes when he challenges the trial 
court's findings of fact. In the attorney discipline context, the Court has stated the task 
clearly: 
When challenging a district comi's findings of fact, the challenging party 'must 
show that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the ( district) court, is 
legally insufficient to support the contested finding.'" In re Discipline of 
Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712, n.14, 2004 UT 3, quoting Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 
1158, 1162 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Addressing the issue in another context, the comi of appeals has made it clear that 
while this Court has now abrogated the overly technical marshaling requirement, State v. 
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ~~ 4 1-42, 326 P.2d 645, "the appellant must acknowledge the 
evidence that supports the findings and demonstrate a basis for overcoming the healthy 
dose of deference owed to factual findings." Nebeker v. Summit County, 338 P.3d 203, 
218-19, 2014 UT App. 244. 
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Mr. BatTett understands his burden, and he also understands that this Court takes 
its plenary power in lawyer discipline cases very seriously. He therefore accepts his 
obligation to assist the Court in considering the validity of the trial court's findings. 
1. The Trial Judge Improperly Converted Purported Stipulated Facts 33 and 52 
to His Own Findings When It Was Shown That The "Facts" Were Not 
Stipulated. 
Where the district court is the finder of fact, it is paramount that the judge 
conectly understand which facts are in dispute and which facts are undisputed. The 
district court erred on this fundamental point before the trial ever began and through its 
verdict. All of Judge Faust's determinations of credibility and weighing of the evidence 
were formed or influenced by his threshold factual errors. In this case, the court's 
apparent belief that "Stipulated Fact No. 33" accurately stated Mr. Barrett's agreement 
that the $3,500 payment by Mr. Williams was for legal services, almost certainly led the 
court into error. In only the second adjudicated fact that appears after the first set of 
stipulated facts, Judge Faust finds that he "does not give much weight to the" testimony 
of Mr. Barrett. Finding No. 39. [R. 369] 
From that point forward, Judge Faust finds confused and conflicting testimony, 
from witnesses who frankly admit they do not lmow, or do not remember, to be clear and 
unequivocal. Specifically, at the close of the sanctions hearing, Judge Faust muses about 
his concerns with Mr. Barrett's credibility. [Tr. 65, R. 526] The judge says that he 
wonders whether Mr. BaITett "truly believes the things he stated," in part "because the 
testimony of the other two wit11esses [Williams and Petersen] was certainly clear. It was 
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unequivocal." (emphasis added) [Tr. 65, R. 526] 
The Court must examine that "unequivocal and credible" testimony specifically, 
and the nature and quality of the trial court's "findings" generally, to fulfill it's critical 
constitutional role in this discipline case. For example: 
2. Williams Testified That He Could Not Remember Any Relevant Details 
Dick Williams' testimony equivocated to the point of contradiction. There was 
nothing resembling the Court's finding of a "clear" and "unequivocal" description of a 
quid pro quo. Williams testified over and over that there was no conversation about an 
exchange of services. Williams didn't remember the details of any conversation 
concerning an alleged deal, nor any specifics of a deal, because no conversation ever took 
place. There was no deal. All quotations and cites are from the violation hearing 
h·anscript. [R. 525] 
Q: Do you recall any part of your conversation with Mr. Ba1Tett where you talked about 
an exchange of services? 
WILLIAMS: Not really, no. 
(Page 33 Screening Panel, presented to Mr. Williams at the district court hearing). 
W: Like I say, four years ago, I can't remember yesterday. I'm 60. Page 125 lines 22-23 
Q: Now you said a couple of times you don't remember very well what happened? 
A: I can't remember a week ago, George. I'm old. Page 126 lines 17-19 
Q: Can you really remember whether or not there was ever a conversation with Mr. 
Ba1Tett about trading --
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A: You know I really don't remember you know that, no. Page 126 lines 20-22. 
Q:And you couldn't give me a date when that conversation--
A: I couldn't give you a date. Page 126 lines 23-25 
Q:[C]an you remember anything anybody said? 
A: No. Page 129 lines 1-2. 
Q. And again you can't remember any conversation, who said what about any kind of 
agreement exchanging services for a new railing? 
A: No sir. 
Q: You can't remember as you sit here today? 
A: 1\1h-uh" (negative). Page 130 lines 20-25 
This testimony is what the trial judge characterized as "unequivocal" testimony. 
Almost nothing is established by preponderance of the evidence out of Mr. Williams' 
mouth. Certainly the finding that there was a "deal," presumably a meeting of the minds, 
cannot be suppo11ed from the actual record. Neither is the notion of a trade deal supported 
by chronology or amounts. When Mr. Williams paid money to Mr. Banett, he did not 
have an SCM invoice that he based that payment on. [Tr.126-130] Mr. Williams owed 
nothing to the finn at that time. His account balance had already been voluntarily written 
off by the firm. If Mr. Williams did owe anything, it would be a sum in the range the 
court determined, $7,912.07. [Finding No. 45, R. 370] Williams $3,500 payment does not 
logically relate to legal services; it relates to Williams' own assessment of what it would 
take to finish the job that he proposed, but then could not finish, and would otherwise 
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leave unsafely incomplete. 
Williams' own actions, lack of any memory of a deal or its supposed details, and 
his payment to Mr. Ban-ett long after he received legal services and shortly after 
providing incomplete construction services, do not provide substantial evidence in 
supp01t of the district court's finding that there was a tr·ade with Mr. Williams. The 
district court en-ed on that fact. 
3. The District Court Ignored That Petersen Changed His Story and That 
Petersen Was Focused On Insufficient Payment for the Shed, Not On Any 
Trade of Services. 
In its Finding No. 70, the trial court determined that Ban-ett and Petersen "reached 
an agreement" to trade legal services for construction services. [R. 372] But Mr. 
Petersen's own testimony shows that Mr. Petersen viewed the shed as a construction cost 
dispute, not as a quid pro quo gone wrong, and that he never accepted having been paid 
for his work on the shed. 
Petersen changed his testimony from the screening panel to the trial. At the 
screening panel, he stated that "the bills that I got from Snow Christensen seemed to 
follow the value of the shed, so I got -- I think the last one maybe was in the $12,000 
range." (Petersen at Page 16 Screening Panel) . Yet at trial, Petersen said, "You know 
going back through the records that I had was that he was all finished with my change of 
custody before we staiied the shed." [Tr. 133). It shows that Petersen originally alleged 
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that he did work on the shed as his legal work was billed, tit for tat1• He then realizes that 
his 01iginal stmy cannot hold, because his records contradict that fairytale, and concocts a 
new explanation at trial. 
If Petersen really thought he had a trade for services, why was there no allowance 
for SCM's legal services in his demand for payment by Mr. Ban-ett. Not necessarily 
dollar for dollar, but Petersen did no such thing and alleged no specific set-off. Instead, 
he simply sought the cost of the shed as he saw it. " -- I did work [ at Joseph's home] that -
- in my opinion, I did not get paid for it." (Screening Panel page 11 lines 10-12). His 
dispute was about the cost of the shed, that Mr. Ban-ett had only paid $5,000, and that he 
was due the full value of $23,000. The "credible" or "unequivocal" Mr. Petersen changed 
the price for the shed over a period of more than two years after completion. He 
exaggerated the quality and size of the shed; describing a loft constructed with a hole 
through plywood, and a ladder installed through the hole, as a two-story building. He 
ultimately priced the shed at more than $200 per square foot. Judge Faust appears to have 
discounted the value testimony by almost two-thirds. That is, at Finding 75 the judge 
appears to set a full cost at $8,700, but because he found that "Mr. Petersen incu1Ted 
approximately in time and labor costs," the issue is confused. Consh·uction costs are 
usually measured in "time and materials," or "labor and materials." Time and labor is a 
redundancy, but the best we can do is assume the judge misspoke. The interesting point is 
1 Petersen also shared this demonstrably false theory with OPC during its initial 
investigative interview (See OPC Memo dated 2/8/13 Bates 286) 
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that with the numbers being all over the place, and the highest claims clearly incredible to 
the judge, he still found Mr. Petersen a reliable witness. 
Once an observer jettisons presuppositions about Mr. Banett and looks at Mr. 
Petersen's allegations as they stand, OPC's theory about a trade of services with Petersen 
falls apart. It was a fable all along. 
The district court's finding that Mr. Petersen was "unequivocal" in his assertion of 
a quid pro quo of services, even after being confronted with its enors of fact by Mr. 
Barrett's motion to amend stipulated facts, is clearly enoneous when taken as a whole. 
The district court ened. 
4. The Court Gave Undue Weight to the Patently Incredible Testimony of 
Andrew Morse. 
The trial judge inexplicably gave great weight to the testimony of SCM president, 
Andrew Morse. The testimony does not support the court's findings, it is internally 
inconsistent, and the trial judge should have found much of the testimony utterly lacking 
in credibility. Specific examples foJlow. 
(a) Morse's rejection and criticism of Barrett's business development claims are 
inconsistent and incredible. 
Perhaps it will help to examine this question by analyzing a concrete example. 
Joseph Barrett was initially reported to the OPC not by SCM, but by Andrew Morse. Mr. 
Morse examined "three years' worth: 2009, 2010 and all of 2011," of expense 
reimbursement claims for Barrett. [Tr. 166-167, R. 525] Morse filed a complaint with 
OPC based on the three years of claims, 2009 through 2011. The claim was dismissed. 
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[Tr. 165, R. 525] 
The court then asked, "why there wasn't any discussion with Mr. BaITett about 
what it is exactly that he had or had not done as far as business development expenses. 
He [Morse] said he didn't. Why? Why didn't they ask him?" 
A. Because I didn't need to ask him. We drew the conclusion, just looking at six 
weeks of reimbursement records [from early 2012], that they were fraught with 
misrepresentations, fraudulent statements, and he was stealing from us, So we 
fired him. [Tr. 181, 1. 22 through 182, 1. 6, R. 525] 
And the basis for any adverse finding based on the foregoing testimony becomes 
even more suneal. From the expense claims for the first six weeks of 2012, that Morse 
said were so probative of theft from the finn that he did not need to ask Barrett any 
questions, just one expense claim became the basis for the one allegation in this case 
alleging dishonesty in claiming a business development lunch expense in California. 
From all of the evidence provided by Morse and Banett, the only two witnesses on 
the issue, Judge Faust made just two factual findings, Nos. 87 and 88- in addition to 
seven related stipulated facts, Nos. 80 to 86-that are specific to the L.A. Lunch. The 
seven stipulated findings are not disputed, but neither are they probative of any rule 
violation. 
Finding of Fact No. 87 c01Tectly states that, "Barrett testified he discussed a legal 
issue with his wife's lunch guest over the phone and no contrary evidence was provided." 
The second Finding, No. 88 states: "The manner in which Mr. Barrett sought 
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reimbursement was deceptive in that the information provided to the Firm gave no 
indication that Mr. BaiTett was not actually at the lunch meeting and was contrary, 
according to the testimony of Mr. M01Tis (sic), to the informal understanding among the 
members of the Firm that a face-to-face meeting with a client was needed in order to be a 
legitimate business development cost which would be paid by the finn." [R. 375] 
Finding No. 88 is the only finding that possibly could support the conclusion that 
Banet violated Rule 8.4(c) by claiming the costs of the lunch with the prospective client, 
but the Finding, and all evidence on the subject, fail on many levels: 
• There is no evidence from Morse or any other witness that, in fact, there is 
a face-to-face policy or standard at SCM. In fact the only standards 
evidence is from Morse, and he is unequivocal that SCM has no standards, 
no oversight, policies (whatever they were) were honored in the breach, and 
there was no "discipline or even loose review ... [for] reimbursing a 
lawyer for business development. [Tr. 162, R. 525] 
• There is no evidence from any witness, fact or expert, that effective 
business development requires face-to-face engagement. This is 2016. 
There is Facetirne, video conferencing, and cell phones that allow, as 
happened here, a business savvy wife to call her business developing 
husband and say, I have a prospect here, talk to her. And the business 
developer husband has the sense to talk about legal issues for 15-20 
minutes, then instmct his wife to not let this prospect buy her own meal. 
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[Tr. 35-36, R. 525 (Banett); Tr. 14, R. 526 (Natasha Roegiers)]. 
• Arrayed against the foregoing we find the trial judge's factual source, 
Andrew Morse, who testified: 
o He was concerned when he looked and saw a "lunch in L.A. with a 
person who is not a client of the firm." [Tr.167, R. 525] Que1y: Does 
either Mr Morse or the trial judge really believe that a lunch with a 
non-client is not business development? 
o "I looked again and there wasn't any billing, certainly, for talking to 
Ms. Gosliska ... he didn't charge any time that day or the next day 
to speaking with this person on the phone." [Tr. 168, R.525] Is it 
really Morse's testimony that SCM bills non-clients for phone calls? 
And how can a reasonable mind square the two preceding 
statements- a non-client, so she doesn't get lunch, but this non-
client should have been billed for a phone call? 
o Even if the conversation occmred, which the judge found to be 
uncontroverted (Finding No. 87], Mr. Morse asks "why would we 
want to pay" if Banett did not have lunch with this person or a meal 
with this person. [Tr. 168, R. 525] Most lawyers would answer this 
question readily-to create goodwill with a potential client. The 
same reason a lawyer may give a potential client Utah Jazz tickets 
for the client and a spouse, even if the lawyer could not attend. 
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Indeed, the Firm's own Compensation Policy encourages this goal 
and these means: "We will reward total contribution, encouraging 
each partner to do what that paiiner does best, in ways that partner 
does them best. While we want to give individual practitioners as 
much autonomy as possible in managing their individual practices, 
we will expect partners to do that within the administrative and 
management structures the finn has implemented to meet these 
economic goals." [SCM Compensation Policy, Addendum 4.] This is 
exactly what Barrett did. 
The ineluctable conclusion regarding the L.A. Lunch allegation, and the general 
business development testimony, is that Morse's position is a constmct- an analysis 
tailored for the sole purpose of justifying termination of a partner who dared to confront 
the firm president. But even if the Court does not share this conclusion, there is zero 
evidence in the transcript that supports Finding No. 88 regarding a policy requiring face-
to-face meetings, which is the only concrete criticism. 2 
2 Finding of Fact No. 89, "[t]he Policy at the firm from 2005 to 2011 required amounts 
above $4,000 which the partners wanted to write-off or write-down required Executive 
Committee approval..." was similarly problematic, as Mr. Morse's testimony on that was 
contradictory and confused. Morse first said, "I don't know when [ the write-off policy on 
page 485, Trial Exhibit 54] was adopted. We get rid of this policy and then adopt a new 
policy" [Tr.160-61, R. 525]; then appeared to admit that trial Exhibit 54 was in effect "for 
those two years" [Tr.177, R. 525]; then apparently decided better of his testimony and re-
stated that the policy stated in Exhibit 54 "was in place from probably 2005 through 
2011," while admitting that he had no idea when it might have been adopted. [Tr.178, R. 
525]. 
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Andrew Morse's bias against Barrett, and his res01t to testimony that is insulting 
in its inconsistency and lack of foundation, is apparent throughout the transcript. Mr. 
Morse, SCM president, could find nothing good to say about Joseph Barrett. [See 
testimony commencing at Tr. 159, R. 525] Reading Morse's testimony about Banett's 
value to the finn, personal qualities, honesty and efficiency, one wonders how Banett 
became a partner after three years at SCM, and stayed in that position for six years. 
Morse answers the question with startling admissions: 
Q. Okay. You talked about his reputation within the firm. You made him a partner, 
right? 
A. Yes, but we have no standards. 
Q. Well, obviously, but-
A. I've got to tell you that. 
Q. Now what? 
A. It's the pulse. If you have a pulse and you're around long enough, you become 
a shareholder. 
Q. Really? Seriously? That's your-
A. I'm afraid so. 
Q. Everybody gets made partner at SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU? 
A. Yeah. Yes. 
(emphasis added). [Tr. 179, 1. 16 to 180, 1. 3, R. 525] 
The foregoing exchange raises many questions, one of which is, how can a 
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complaint initiated by this witness, the president of a major, respected law firm, albeit 
one with no standards, advance a claim that a partner has violated firm standards? 
It is impossible to overstate how shocking and incredible this testimony is. It is 
also necessary to ask how an unbiased or careful judge could enter numerous purp01ied 
findings of fact that have no support except from this witness. The testimony cited above; 
however, shows that this is what happened. Findings based on Morse's testimony can 
only be described as clearly, even manifestly, enoneous. 
A final word on business development: Banett's uncontroverted testimony is that 
he was assigned to teach young lawyers business development practices, but Morse 
criticizes Barrett for claiming substantially more for business development than the 
average SCM partner. It should not surprise anyone that the partner who is actively 
attracting clients is investing more of himself and finn resources in the endeavor than the 
average partner. It is also not a surprise that when Joseph Banett separated from the finn, 
he had thiliy clients of his own, twenty-eight of whom followed him to his new practice. 
[Uncontroverted testimony of Barrett at Tr. 42, R. 526] 
5. Judge Faust's Findings of Fact Are Uneven, Inconsistent and of Generally 
Poor Quality. 
At first glance it appears that the tiial judge has undertaken a detailed and 
thorough consideration of the evidence. After a one day bench trial, the trial court entered 
92 Findings of Fact. On closer examination, we see that 67 of those Findings are 
stipulated-and two of the purportedly stipulated Findings are in fact stJ.·ongly 
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contested-Findings 33 and 52. When Mr. Barrett's counsel challenged those two 
Findings, the trial judge ultimately opted for the easy fix proposed by the OPC, and 
"moved" the purported stipulated facts to facts found by the court, without benefit of any 
consideration or explanation why the Findings were accurate. 
Counting the two transposed Findings, the comi ostensibly weighed the evidence 
and found 27 Findings to be more probably true than not. However, for a number of those 
Findings, it is not at all clear that there was any weighing or fact finding occmTing. There 
are four Findings, Nos. 71, 90, 91 and 92 that consist solely of statements that a witness 
or witnesses "testified" to some facts or conclusions. For example, Finding 71 consists of 
four short sentences commencing "Mr. Petersen testified ... " followed by a statement. 
Did the judge believe Mr. Petersen? Was there contrary evidence? Did the judge weigh 
evidence at all regarding the four statements? 
The judge certainly recites competing evidence in some Findings, but two, Nos. 39 
and 72, illustrate why it is not possible for this Court to accept the Findings from the trial 
court uncritically, if at all. Finding 72 consists of 13 lines of text discussing the fact that 
Mr. Ba.nett requested Mr. Petersen's $2,500 retainer refunded, and the reason for the 
refund. What actually happened here could be very important to this Court's 
detennination of Mr. Barrett's state of mind, should the Court find misconduct. The full 
text of the Finding is: 
Mr. Petersen testified the agreement with Mr. Barrett included his paying a 
$2,500.00 retainer up front and he would get the $2,500.00 at the end of their 
agreement. The Court finds the testimony of Mr. Ba.nett that he refunded the 
34 
$2,500.00 because Mr. Petersen wanted to visit his son in Hawaii and he had no 
money misleading, and an attempt to explain the refund of the retainer to Mr. 
Petersen without admitting there was an agreement in advance to return the $2,500 
retainer to Mr. Petersen. [The son was the subject of the custody modification that 
Mr. Banett helped Mr. Petersen resolve- Mr. Petersen had not seen his son for a 
year or so.] Mr. Petersen did not testify as to what reason he gave or what was 
stated to Mr. Barrett when he got his retainer back, other than the refund of the 
$2,500 was part of their agreement. Despite Mr. Petersen so testifying, he very 
well may have needed his retainer money to fund his travel to Hawaii to see his 
son and may have indicated the same to Mr. Barrett. Thus the Court cannot 
definitively detennine Mr. Barrett falsely testified to the Court that Mr. Petersen 
asked for a retainer refund and the reason why he needed the money. The Court, 
however, finds the return of the retainer funds was not for the reason stated by Mr. 
Barrett, i.e. he was attempting to help Mr. Petersen, but rather was a return of Mr. 
Petersen's funds as they had agreed. 
What, ultimately, did the trial judge decide here? That it may have been true that 
Mr. Petersen in fact had the need for the money identified by Mr. Barrett? But it may 
have been true that Mr. Petersen in fact had the need Mr. BaITett identified? Misleading, 
but the Court cannot really say Banett spoke falsely under oath. But the Court can say 
funds were not returned to help Mr. Petersen, but rather return was part of an agreement. 
But does this foreclose a conclusion that there was an agreement to help Mr. Petersen 
preserve his relationship with his son, and not an agreement to trade services or deceive 
the firm? 
Finding No. 39 is a similar mishmash. It leads out with the death sentence 
determination that the court "does not give much weight to Mr. Barrett's testimony," 
after which the court recites a string of things .Mr. Williams said, which it appears the 
court is saying are now established facts , all because Mr. Barrett is not credible. Mr. 
Banett submits this is a too easy way for the court to avoid considering and weighing all 
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evidence on each of the issues implicated in the paragraph 3. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S PROCEEDINGS WERE INFECTED BY 
APPARENT BIAS, PREJUDICE OR JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT. 
At the conclusion of the sanctions hearing held on March 2, 2015, Judge Faust 
shared some thoughts, and facts, with counsel. The court first stated that he would solve 
the issue of the dispute over two critical "facts" by simply moving "stipulated" facts 33 
and 52 to the section of facts found by the court. Mr. Bauett moved for those paragraphs 
to be stricken. The prejudice of retaining those facts, which lack sufficient evidentiary 
support in any event, is substantial. Either the court did not yet realize-or was unwilling 
to aclmowledge- the gravity of his enors. 
If Judge Faust read alleged stipulations submitted before trial, he likely inconectly 
believed such stipulations existed before trial commenced and during his evaluation of all 
witnesses and evidence, including and especially Mr. Banett. The trial court was so film 
in its view of who was credible and who not, he accused Mr. Ba1Tett of lying to the Court. 
[Finding No. 39, R. 369] and in his bench comments after the sanctions hearing. [Tr. 65, 
R. 526] In that context, it is not surprising that the Court was skeptical of Mr. Banett' s 
3 For example, the district court looked inexplicably askance at Mr. Banett 
misidentifying the worker who started the railing job as Williams' brother-in-law. 
Finding No. 39. There was no dispute that someone other than Williams commenced the 
labor and failed to complete it. That person's identity or relationship to Williams is 
simply in-elevant to the parties conduct at issue. Yet, the district court, somehow merited 
a distinct finding of that "fact." 
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testimony generally. And it is not unreasonable to say that the judge came into the 
hearing with some measure of bias, "An inclination, leaning, tendency, bent; a 
preponderating disposition or disposition or propensity." The Oxford English Dictionary, 
2d ed, 1989, at Vol. II, p.166 . 
This inclination or leaning, in tum, quite naturally, and often without malice, can 
"influence the mind or judgment ... beforehand (often unfairly)." OED, Vol. XII pp. 
356-57 . 
The record shows that the trial court was clearly, and improperly biased against 
Mr. Banett as a result of the comi's own inconect assumptions about the facts. 
As Judge Faust continued his comments at the end of the sanctions hearing, he 
also disclosed actions on his part that are clearly improper, but it also appears that the 
judge did not recognize this fact. The Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.9(C) provides: "A 
judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the 
evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed." Utah R. J. 
Admin. Code Canon 2, Rule 2.9(C). This bar on judicial investigation "extends to 
information available in all mediums, including electronic." Rule 2.9, Comment 6. 
Commencing at Tr. 66: 
I don't doubt that he has the intent to try to help people. I don't doubt that he 
tried to do good things for people. I don't doubt that he's motivated to try to make 
a difference in people's lives, and I think that he has. But I think that also misses the 
point. It's not necessarily, was he motivated when he took these cases and did the 
work for these gentlemen .. . .I think that misses the mark. The mark was did he deal 
honestly and fairly with his paiiners? So the motivation to actually engage in the 
service is separate and distinct, at least in this Court's mind, from what his behavior 
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and conduct was. And it frankly comes down to do I think and do I really believe 
that he gave the Comi false testimony and false evidence during the disciplinary 
proceedings? 
It also comes down to I think something that is not listed there, and that is I 
think that there was a violation ... of the tmst that he had between pa1iners. Now,J 
looked up to see if Snow Christensen was a part11ership or a corporation because we 
all know there's fiduciary duties between partners. They're a c01:poration. 
Nevertheless, I think that outstanding principle still is there, of that we owe to the 
people with whom we have business dealings with, our partners. to not violate the 
trust and confidence that's reposed in those relationships ... 
( emphasis added). [Tr. 65-66] 
Mr. Barrett does not suggest that Judge Faust harbored personal animus against him, 
but the trial judge appears to have prejudged Mr. Barrett very early in the process, and to 
some degree that judgment came from outside sources, and they are sources that should 
not be consulted. The trial judge sought out his own evidence, and fashioned his own view 
of what duties the attorney owes, and to whom. The Rules of Professional Conduct are the 
source for the duties and the sanctions. They are adequate, but if the conduct requires 
depaiiure from the rules, then this Comi, and only this Couti, has the constitutional duty 
and power to determine the duty, and determine the sanction. 
Even if the Court is not troubled by the judge's recourse to evidence and duties not 
set forth in the record, it must be troubled by the stark admission that, after determining 
SCM is not a traditional partnership, the trial judge simply took it upon himself to extend 
partnership duties to the employees of SCM who are shareholders, but not partners. The 
actions were improper, and they were also a probable extrajudicial "authority" that 
inevitably, even if subtly, influenced both the culpability and sanctions determinations. 
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The district court openly revealed that it had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct 
by researching facts about the case. When the court's research results did not fit his 
expectations about paitnership and fiduciary duties, the Court nonetheless derived some 
duty of loyalty, or trust, or confidence from his research that was never presented by 
either paity, based solely on the district court's independent factual research about the 
firm. 
Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, this amounted to an impermissible ex parte 
communication. See generally Rule 2.9, entitled "Ex Parte Communications" describing 
impermissible communi.cations, including a judge's independent research of the facts of 
the case. 
At best, the district court's violation of that principle creates the appearance that 
the court was not impartial. There is no request for disqualification at this time, because 
there is ample cause for this Comt to engage in its own thorough analysis of the 
evidentiary record and reach its own conclusions. In the unlikely event, however, that this 
matter should be remanded to the trial court, Mr. Banett respectfully requests that a 
different judge be assigned. 
This Cou1t's precedent makes it clear that in lawyer discip line cases, there are a 
number of tools available to the Comt to administer the lawyer discipline process, and the 
Court has a clear option to receive and benefit from the trial comt's labors without being 
bound by the product of that labor. In the Matter of the Discipline of Ray Harding, Jr., 
2004 UT 100, 104 P.3d 1220, Mr. Harding argued that he was entitled to certain process, 
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including a district court proceeding, before his matter reached this Court. The response 
was pointed: 
The district cowi, in lawyer discipline cases, has only the jurisdiction or authority 
we delegate to it ... .In Harding's case, knowing that we neither needed nor 
desired the paiticipation of the district comi, we directed the Bar to return the 
matter directly to us for resolution. Our primary purpose was to develop a factual 
record that included Harding's claims and defenses .... 
Id. at~ 19. 
In this case, BaLTett submits that he has provided ample reasons for the Court to be 
concerned that while the gathering of a factual record was undertaken with skill and 
overall efficiency on the part of the judge and lawyers, the adjudicatmy process has been 
compromised. Outside the lawyer discipline context, vacation of Findings and Orders, or 
outright reversal may be a necessaiy remedy. In this matter, Mr. Barrett accepts that the 
record exists, this Court has the transcripts and exhibits, and it is respectfully requested 
that the Court undertake its own determination of the facts and law and proceed to the 
sanctions determination. 
POINT III 
THE OPC DEMAND FOR DISBARMENT IS NEITHER WARRANTED NOR 
REQUIRED BY LA WYERS' DISCIPLINE RULES. 
The OPC's insistent demand for disbannent, and its hyperbolic descriptions of the 
conduct ascribed to Mr. Barrett and the damage to SCM, and perhaps to Williams and 
Petersen, does our disciplinai-y system a disservice. Trnly egregious misconduct happens. 
Lawyers indeed steal from clients and their finns . Characterizing Mr. Barrett's conduct 
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with the opprobrium employed by the OPC, even if one accepts the worst of the trial 
judge's description, shows how disproportionate the OPC's demand is. 
At some level Mr. Banett may have made mistakes. But as he did so, at whatever 
level this Court finally determines, Mr. Banett was, at the heart of things, helping two 
fathers remain meaningfully engaged in their sons' lives. The haim to SCM is the other 
side of the story. Accepting for discussion the OPC numbers, SCM maybe did not collect 
$8,801.10 on the Petersen case, but that is a counterfeit number. SCM would only have 
received that gross sum if Mr. Petersen could ever pay it, an unlikely eventuality, but let's 
assume he pays the whole amount. The fom shares that collection with Mr. BaiTett, 
overhead, and other partners. The finn probably receives less, but let' s assume 50%, or 
$4,400.00, plus a reasonable net amount of the $7,912.07 from Williams, or about 
$4,000.00. The total loss is $8,400.00. SCM used this leverage to pressure Mr. Banett 
into giving up about $32,000 that was absolutely his money. There is no damage to SCM 
that in fact lines up, chronologically or any other way, with the legal work 
In taking a more reasoned approach, the sanction issued by Judge Faust is 
instructive. Early in the case, the judge was predisposed to see Mr. Ban-ett as a liar. He 
found three violations of Rule 8.4(c). Mr. BaITett feared disbarment or a very substantial 
suspension. In fact, after the sanctions hearing, the trial judge first sanctioned 1'1fr. Banett 
with a 150 day suspension, effective in thirty days. But he then stayed the suspension, 
over OPC's strong opposition, and allowed Mr. Barrett to practice without restriction in 
the interim. On its face, this seems an improbable decision from a district court that stated 
4 1 
that Mr. BaITett had lied to that very court, under oath. Why would the district court 
allow such an attorney to practice over the many months until an appeal was complete? 
The explanation is, of course, that the cowt had by then understood that Mr. 
Barrett had not lied. In making the stay decision, the trial com1 concluded that Mr. 
Barrett's practice of law does not pose a substantial threat or risk of harm to the public 
and "Mr. Barretf s conduct does not, nor did it impair or diminish his legal abilities or 
skills in the practice of law." [R. 514-16] The Comt fu1ther concluded that Mr. BaITett 
did not harm the public or a client and that he had completed full restitution to his law 
firm. If the Comt affirms a violation occuITed, it should determine an admonition is 
sufficient. The OPC presented no evidence at the sanctions hearing. The only evidence 
presented at the sanctions hearing was only mitigation, which showed that there was no 
hann, and which at most only supported negligence. 
The Court should vacate the order of suspension and dismiss this matter. 
Alternately, the Court should only impose a sanction approp1iate to such conduct, as 
required by the Rules. Although Mr. Banett respectfully submits that no professional 
misconduct is presented herein, if the Court disagrees, the presumptive sanction in this 
circumstance is admonition. Rule 14-605(d)(2). 
1. The Presumptive Sanction, If Any, Is Admonition 
Since the OPC only alleges a violation of Rule 8.4(c), the primary question for 
this Court is to decide is whether Mr. Baneit's conduct meets the requisite level of 
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dishonesty, fraud , deceit or misrepresentation to even approach the sanction level pursued 
by the OPC. 
"Our review of disciplinary proceeding[ s] is guided by the stated purpose and 
scope of the RLDD," which are "construed so as to achieve substantial justice and 
fairness in disciplinary matters." In re Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, ,i20, 11 P.3d 284, citing 
RLDD l(c). 
Mr. Barrett's conduct was, at most, negligent. Mr. Barrett concedes, as he did at 
trial, that with the benefit of hindsight (regarding his actions, the possible viewpoints of 
clients, and the unjustified vindictiveness of his former partners even after resolving their 
billing disputes), that he should have more clearly documented that his commercial 
dealings with his clients were unrelated to the legal services he provided to them. The 
mles do not preclude an attorney from hiring a client as a contractor. 
Yet, the only "plan" that Mr. Barrett undertook in his conduct was to accurately 
and contemporaneously record all of his time spent on both the Williams and Petersen 
matters pursuant to law firm policy, with the intent to permit his partners at the firm to 
know exactly what he was doing on each file and when (as he did with his other files). 
Mr. BaiTett secured written hourly retainer letters from both Petersen and Williams [Tr. 
185, R. 525] He performed the internal conflict searches required for opening new law 
firm files and appropriately deposited funds into trust. The firm "knew about" the 
Williams and Petersen matters, from start to finish. 
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Based on the foregoing, Mr. BaiTett respectfully submits that his conduct is not a 
violation of any Rule of Professional Conduct. As originally concluded by the OPC, this 
matter represents a conflict between former law firm partners - which was voluntarily 
resolved to the parties' mutual satisfaction (See Settlement Agreement, admitted as 
Respondent's Trial Exhibit 66). 
This is not a situation where a client has been aggrieved in any way. To the 
contrary, all of Banett' s actions were for the benefit of his clients. This case is comprised 
of vengeful allegations of law firm policy violations - not the sort of conduct wa1Tanting 
a suspension, let alone disbarment. 
Mr. Banett fully complied within the strictures and culture at SCM and his 
conduct caused no injury to anyone. There was no evidence of harm to the finn. To the 
contrary- the firm and Mr. Morse stated that they were satisfied. 
2. The next most severe sanction is a public reprimand 
For years, a reprimand was considered a public embanassment, but not a 
devastating blight on a lawyer's career. That is no longer true. A public reprimand can do 
great damage. News of the reprimand is immediately accessible, and always available. In 
2008, a Fordham Law Review Article4 included some cogent observations regarding 
attorney discipline in the federal district court, which is public discipline, because the 
order is circulated to every court in which the lawyer practices. The setting is 
4 Carlos R. Pasquale, "Scolded: Can an Attorney Appeal a District Court's Order 
Finding Professional Misconduct?" 2008 FORDHAM L. REV. 219. 
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distinguishable, but the concerns regarding the effect on the lawyer's reputation and 
practice are on point: 
An attorney's professional reputation is, without a doubt, an important asset. Justice 
Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Cooter & Gell [v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384,413 (1990)], articulated this by writing, " [d]espite the changes 
that have taken place at the bar since I left the active practice 20 years ago, I still 
believe that most lawyers are wise enough to know that their most precious asset is 
their professional reputation." Having a good reputation in one's community can 
affect the level of business that a lawyer receives and the kind of clients and business 
that a lawyer attracts. A court's published finding chastising an attorney will likely 
damage his or her professional reputation in that attorney's legal community .. . . 
"Scolded," 2008 FORDHAM L.REV at 243. Pasquale's article also recognizes the 
impact of our wired world in the internet age: 
Because attorney's today so heavily rely upon the Internet to generate new business, 
these widely accessible [discipline] opinions can be extremely damaging to an 
attorney's reputation, and potential clients likely will not perceive or consider a 
difference between an "explicit" reprimand and a finding of blatant attorney 
misconduct when deciding whether to hire or even to fire an attorney because of a 
judicial finding . 
Id. at 244. 
The reality of what a public reprimand means, and how accessible it now is to 
anyone with an internet connection or even a phone (well beyond fellow attorneys and 
judges), suggests careful consideration of the objectives and consequences of attorney 
discipline. When an admonition is not enough, but the conduct does not warrant loss of 
professional employment through a suspension, a reprimand may be a fair middle ground. 
However, we should not delude ourselves that a reprimand is not serious. It is likely to 
harm a lawyer's reputation for many years . 
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The district court in this case lacked evidence of any conduct that would seriously 
reflect on Mr. Barrett's ability to practice law. Indeed, the stay of suspension says as 
much; his conduct, even in the eyes of the district court, did not "impair or diminish his 
legal skills or abilities to practice law," did not pose a "substantial risk or threat of 
irreparable hann" to the public, nor any harm to a client. Even though OPC strenuously 
argued otherwise, the district court clearly continued to trust Mr. Barrett as an officer of 
the court who was fit to represent clients and our profession during the stay. 
Given the already public nature of the present proceedings, a public reprimand 
might not necessarily impact Mr. Banett' s reputation any further. Yet, upon reflection 
and analysis of the transcript in this matter, and the blatant misstatements by the primary 
complaining witness combined with the inconsistencies within the record, public 
reprimand is unsupported by the record. 
3. Unchallenged Mitigating Factors 
The OPC did not call any witnesses at the sanctions hearing. There was substantial 
mitigating testimony, as allowed under Rule 14-607(b). Mr. Barrett enjoyed strong 
support from eminent citizens, as well as from his wife. 
OPC concedes that Mr. Banett has remained cooperative throughout these 
proceedings, a mitigating factor under Rule 14-607(b )(5). In fact, Mr. Banett voluntarily 
obtained and produced the check he received from Mr. Williams which he understood 
was to complete the unfinished railing project - not for legal fees. [Tr. 36, R. 526] 
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There was also no question in the district court's mind that Mr. Barrett intended to 
help his clients and therefore lacked a selfish motive in his actions. See Rule 14-
607(b)(2) (absence of selfish motive). Mr. Banett's wife, Dr. Roegiers, testified at 
sanctions that she was pait of the discussion when Petersen said he would build a shed for 
a fixed price of $5,000, and that she was present when Dick Williams offered to repair a 
dilapidated railing that presented a hazard to the four young Barrett children. [Tr. 113, R. 
526] 
The district court also heard testimony from former SCM Vice President Stan 
Preston, who spoke highly of Mr. Barrett's reputation within the firm as an ethical and 
profitable lawyer. Preston also testified that the circumstances of how SCM and Mr . 
Morse handled the complaint in this matter were unusual: 
Q. In your experience in management at [SCM] when you were there, were there issues 
concerning other lawyers and how cost reimbursements were done from time to time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how ai·e those handled? 
A. Well, they were handled internally. If concerns were raised, I would deal with those, 
as a member of the executive committee and sometimes as a member of the board, and 
they would be reviewed and the firm would take what it determined to be appropriate 
action if there were concerns or abuses of the policies. There were abuses by people on 
occas10n. 
Q. And you would do what you thought would be appropriate discipline? 
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A. Absolutely. 
Q. Were any of those matters ever refened to the Office of Professional Conduct while 
you were there? 
A. Not to my knowledge. Certainly when I was in management there was none. 
[Tr. 21-22, R.526] Mr. Preston was on the Board of Directors for at least ten of his 
twenty-seven years in practice at SCM. [Tr. 17-18, R. 526] 
After working in another law firm (Tesch Law) and creating a small boutique firm 
since leaving SCM, Mr. Banett chose to practice as a solo practitioner. He has 
affirmatively sought to prevent repetition of any of the challenged circumstances through 
such interim reform during the four years since his former partner personally filed the bar 
complaint against him. See Rule 14-607(b)(l 1) (interim mitigating circumstances). 
Mr. Banett' s settlement with the law firm and relinquishment of more than 
$32,000 due to him caused him to borrow funds to commence his own practice, and to 
the extent that this exceeded the harm to SCM, amounts to the "imposition of other 
penalties or sanctions." See Rule 14-607(b)(l2). 
Last, Mr. Banett remorsefully testified that he was responsible for any 
misunderstandings of Williams and Petersen about their dealings, and acknowledged that 
while his L.A. lunch reimbursement was not dishonest, it was sloppy. See Rule 14-
607(b)(13) (mitigating remorse). While not admitting to professional misconduct, 
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Barrett admits that as a learned dedicated professional , he could and should have 
disclosed more to his partners. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons slated, the Court shou ld vacate the Order of Suspension and, based 
on the defective and improper nature of the proceedings, impose no discipline. If the 
Court does not agree that no discipline should be imposed, the Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
respectfully requests that the Court impose, at most, an admonition . 
DATED this 11 th day of March, 2016. 
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FILEJ? DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 11 2015 
SALTIAKECOU~ 
Dep Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of: 
JOSEPH P. BARRETT #8088 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 130907818 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
This matter came before the Court on January 27, 2015, for an Adjudication Trial pursuant to 
Rule 14-51 l(e) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"). The Utah State Bar's 
Office of Professional Conduct was represented by Todd Wahlquist, Deputy Senior Counsel, and 
Respondent, Joseph P. Barrett, was represented by counsel, George M. Haley and J. Andrew Sjoblom, of 
Holland and Hart. Prior to trial, both counsel stipulated to undisputed facts which are set forth below. 
Further, having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby makes the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. Joseph P. Barrett, who is an attorney in the State of Utah and a member of the Utah State 
Bar, is charged with unprofessional conduct. The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct in its 
Amended Complaint brought three counts of violation of Rule 8.4( c) - Misconduct. Count I - Williams 
Matter, Count II- Petersen matter and Count III - California Matter. Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
' 
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BARRETT DISCIPLINE PAGE2 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
2. According to the records of the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar, Joseph P. 
Barrett's address is in Salt Lake City, Utah 84103. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Rule 14-
51 l(b) of the RLDD, in that, at all relevant times, Respondent resided in Salt Lake County and the alleged 
misconduct originated in Salt Lake County. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Rule 14-
51 l(a), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (amended January I, 2003) ("RLDD"). 
3. The Complaint was brought pursuant to a directive of a Screening Panel of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, and is based upon an Informal Complaint submitted by 
Andrew Morse against Joseph P. Barrett. 
4. On February 15, 2013, the OPC sent Mr. Barrett an Amended Notice of fuformal 
Complaint ("NOIC"). 
5. On September 5, 2013, a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the 
Utah Supreme Court ("the Screening Panel") heard the matter. 
6. At the conclusion of the hearing on September 5, 2013, the Screening Panel directed the 
OPC to file a fonnal complaint against Mr. Barrett. 
7. Joseph Barrett was employed at the firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau ("the Firm") 
from 2003 until February 2012. 
WILLIAMS MA TIER 
STIPULATED FACTS 
8. Richard Williams is the owner of Dick's Backhoe and Sewer Connection. 
9. In June 2007, Mr. Williams' son was charged in a criminal matter. 
10. On June 15, 2007, Mr. Barrett appeared in the criminal matter. 
BARRETT DISCIPLINE PAGE3 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
11. On July 30, 2007, Mr. Williams paid a $1,000.00 retainer that was deposited into the 
Finn's trust account under the name Dick's Backhoe and Sewer. 
12. This criminal matter was closed in December 2007. 
13. Mr. Barrett did not bill any time against the retainer in this first criminal matter in 2007. 
14. In 2008, Mr. Williams asked Mr. Barrett to assist him in a collections matter for his 
company. 
I 5. A small amount of work was performed by Mr. Barrett on behalf of Dick's Backhoe and 
Sewer. 
16. On April 3, 2008, $175 in legal fees were charged to Mr. Williams' account. 
17. On August 1, 2008, Mr. Barrett requested the $175 charge to be written-off Mr. 
Williams' bill. 
18. On August 7, 2008, $60 in legal fees (without interest) were charged to Mr. Williams. 
19. On August 29, 2008, Mr. Barrett requested the $60 charge to be written-off Mr. 
Williams' bill. 
20. In the summer of 2008, Mr. Williams performed construction work at Mr. Barrett's 
personal residence. 
21. On September 5, 2008, $225 in legal fees were charged to Mr. Williams. 
22. On September 5, 2008, Mr. Barrett requested the $225 charge to be written-off Mr. 
Williams' bill. 
23. In February 2010, Mr. Williams' son was charged in several new criminal matters, 
including a felony. 
• 
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BARRETT DISCIPLINE PAGE4 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
24. Mr. Williams contacted Mr. Barrett about representing his son again. 
25. In March 2010, Mr. Barrett filed appearances in the criminal matters. 
26. Between March 2010 and July 2010, Mr. Barrett billed $7,665 to Mr. Williams' account. 
27. In March 2010, Mr. Williams paid $300 to the firm by credit card. 
28. In or around June or July 2010, Mr. Williams provided construction services to Mr. 
Barrett at his personal residence in the form of a wrought iron railing. 
29. Between June 14 and June 25, Mr. Barrett requested a total of $7,446.57 in fees, costs, 
and interest to be written-off Mr. Williams' bill. 
30. Mr. Williams was not able to complete the railing project. 
31. On July 21,2010, Mr. or Mrs. Williams wrote a check for $3,500 made out to Mr. Barrett 
personally. 
32. Mr. Barrett deposited the $3,500 into his personal account. 
33. The Firm was unaware that Mr. Williams paid $3,500 directly to Mr. Barrett for legal 
services. 
34. Between June 3, 2011 and August 3, 2011, Mr. Barrett billed $400 in legal fees to Mr. 
Williams' account. 
35. On December 27, 2011, $400 was billed against the $1,000 retainer that had been 
deposited in 2007. 
36. On April 26, 2012, after Mr. Barrett left the Firm, the Firm refunded $600 to Mr. 
Williams, representing the balance of the trust account. 
BARRETT DISCIPLINE PAGES FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
37. Of the $8,612.07 in total fees, costs and interest billed to Mr. Williams, he only paid $700 
to the finn, and the remaining $7,912.07 was written-off. 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT FROM TRIAL 
38. Mr. Williams retained the Finn through Mr. Barrett to represent his son. 
39. The Court, after hearing the testimony of Mr. Barrett, does not give much weight to the 
same. Mr. Barrett testified the railing installed at his house by Mr. Williams was a gift and he wrote-off 
the retainer and bills to help Mr. Williams, in contrast to the testimony of Mr. Williams, who clearly and 
without hesitation admitted he traded the iron work at the home of Mr. Barrett in exchange for the legal 
fees relating to his son's criminal matter. Mr. Williams further testified he was the one who suggested the 
trade. Further, Mr. Williams testified since the railing was not completed, he determined how much he 
had personally already paid out in costs on the railing work to third parties and then determined how 
much he owed Mr. Barrett for the balance of the legal work for his son and sent a check of $3,5000 for 
the difference to Mr. Barrett. Mr. Williams also testified the person working on the railing was not his 
brother-in-law, which is contrary to Mr. Barrett's testimony. 
40. Mr. Barrett and Mr. Williams reached an agreement whereby Mr. Barrett would provide 
legal services in exchange for construction services performed by Mr. Williams at Mr. Barrett's personal 
residence. Mr. Williams testified this agreement was an oral agreement and nothing was in writing 
between he and Mr. Barrett. 
41. The Finn was unaware of the agreement between Mr. Barrett and Mr. Williams. 
42. The value of the construction services did not equal the value of the legal services. 
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BARRETT DISCIPLINE PAGE6 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
43. Mr. Williams, or his wife on his behalf, directly paid Mr. Barrett $3,500 which Mr. 
Williams testified was the difference between the value of the legal services and the value of the 
construction services since they were not equal amounts. 
44. The $3,500 paid by Mr. Williams to Mr. Barrett belonged to the Firm. 
45. Of the $8,612.07 in total fees, costs and interest billed to Mr. Williams, he only paid $700 
to the firm, and the remaining $7,912.07 was written-off by Mr. Barrett and thus by Mr. Barrett's firm. 
46. The Firm was entitled to the value of the construction services performed by Mr. 
Williams at Mr. Barrett's personal residence. 
PETERSEN MATTER 
STIPULATED FACTS 
47. Dave Petersen is one of the owners of D&T Landscaping. 
48. Between 2006 and 2009, D&T provided various landscaping services to Mr. Barrett at his 
personal residence. 
49. Mr. Barrett paid D&T for these landscaping services. 
50. In November 2010, Mr. Petersen retained Mr. Barrett and the Firm to represent him in a 
custody modification matter. 
51. On November 2, 2010, Mr. Petersen paid a $2,500 retainer to the Firm that was deposited 
into the Firm's trust account. 
52. Initially, it was anticipated that a shed would be built for approximately $5,000. 
53. Between November 2010 and August 201 1, the Firm billed $8,801.10 in fees, costs and 
interest to Mr. Petersen's account. 
BARRETT DISCIPLINE PAGE? FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
54. Mr. Petersen received regular bills from the Finn. 
55. Mr. Petersen's modification case was concluded on or about July 20, 2011. 
56. On or about August 9, 2011, Mr. Petersen or D&T started construction on the shed at Mr. 
Barrett's personal residence. 
57. On August 25, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested the accounting department at the Finn to 
write-off approximately half of Mr. Petersen's bill. 
58. On September 20, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested the accounting department at the Finn to 
write-off halfofthe remaining balance on Mr. Petersen's bill. 
59. On November 22, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested the accounting department at the firm to 
write-off the remaining balance on Mr. Petersen's bill. 
60. In the end, Mr. Barrett requested to be written-off a total of$8,913.54 in legal fees, costs 
and interest on Mr. Petersen's account. 
61. Mr. Petersen finished most of the construction on Mr. Barrett's shed by December 2011. 
62. On or about December 13, 2011, Mr. Barrett requested the accounting department to 
refund the $2,500 retainer paid by Mr. Petersen. 
63. The Finn refunded the $2,500 to Mr. Petersen. 
64. On December 14, 2011, Mr. Barrett wrote a letter to Mr. Petersen stating that the Finn 
had provided $10,577.25 in legal services to Mr. Petersen. 
65. Mr. Petersen did not pay the Firm for any of the legal services provided. 
66. In February 2012 Mr. Barrett's employment with the Firm ended. 
67. In April 2012, Mr. Barrett made two payments to D&T for the shed totaling $3,030. 
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68. In addition, in November 2011, Mr. Barrett paid $758 directly to the company that 
painted the shed, and in September 2011 paid $1,204 to Home Depot for doors and windows for the shed. 
69. For the shed, Mr. Barrett paid approximately $5,000. 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT FROM TRIAL 
70. Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen reached an agreement whereby Mr. Barrett would provide 
legal services to Mr. Petersen for his custody matter in exchange for a shed to be constructed by Mr. 
Petersen at Mr. Barrett's personal residence. 
71. Mr. Petersen testified there was an oral agreement, not a written agreement between Mr. 
Barrett and himself to build the shed in exchange for Mr. Barrett's legal work. Mr. Petersen testified this 
agreement was made before the work on the shed began. Mr. Petersen testified his first estimate for the 
shed was $5,000 as a starting point and they would go from there. Mr. Petersen testified it was not a flat 
rate contract. 
72. Mr. Petersen testified the agreement with Mr. Barrett included his paying a $2,500.00 
retainer up front and he would get the $2,500.00 at the end of their agreement. The Court finds the 
testimony of Mr. Barrett that he refunded the $2,500.00 retainer because Mr. Petersen wanted to visit his 
son in Hawaii and he had no money misleading, and an attempt to explain the refund of the retainer to Mr. 
Petersen without admitting there was an agreement in advance to return the $2,500 retainer to Mr. 
Petersen. Mr. Petersen did not testify as to what reason he gave or what was stated to Mr. Barrett when 
he got his retainer back, other than the refund of the $2,500 was part of their agreement. Despite Mr. 
Petersen not so testifying, he very well may have needed his retainer money to fund his travel to Hawaii 
to see his son and may have indicated the same to Mr. Barrett. Thus, the Court cannot definitively 
BARRETT DISCIPLINE PAGE9 FIN.pINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
determine Mr. Barrett falsely testified to the Court that Mr. Petersen asked for a retainer refund and the 
reason why he needed the money. The Court, however, finds the return of the retainer funds was not for 
the reason stated by Mr. Barrett, i.e. he was attempting to help Mr. Petersen, but rather was a return of 
Mr. Petersen' s funds as they had agreed. 
73. Mr. Petersen received regular bills from the Firm, but did not pay them because Mr. 
Barrett told him not to worry about them. Mr. Petersen testified he was going to take care of the bills and 
costs at D&T and Mr. Barrett would take care of the bills incurred by him. 
74. On December 14, 2011, Mr. Barrett wrote a letter to Mr. Petersen stating that the Firm 
had provided $10,577.25 in legal services to Mr. Petersen. Mr. Barrett stated he had been asked to 
provide this letter by Mr. Petersen and he did not know the reason why Mr. Peterson needed the letter. 
However, Mr. Petersen testified he was surprised to get this letter from Mr. Barrett. 
75. In constructing the shed, Mr. Petersen incurred approximately $8,700 in time and labor 
costs. 
76. In February 2012, after being confronted by the Firm regarding other accounting issues, 
Mr. Barrett's employment with the Firm ended. 
77. For the shed, which has an asserted value or cost of approximately $23,700, Mr. Barrett 
paid approximately $5,000. Mr. Petersen testified he would have reduced the January 2, 2012 invoice by 
$1,000.00 and the rest of the invoice is correct. See. Exhibit 38 pp. 7-8. Mr. Petersen testified the actual 
cost of the shed, without the costs paid by Mr. Barrett himself is $15,170.63 as reflected on Ex. 3 8 p. 6. 
78. The Firm was unaware of the agreement between Mr. Barrett and Mr. Petersen to trade 
legal services for a shed. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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79. The Firm was entitled to the value of the construction services performed by Mr. Petersen 
at Mr. Barrett's personal residence equal to the value of the legal services provided by the Finn to Mr. 
Petersen. 
CALIFORNIA MA TIER 
STIPULATED FACTS 
80. On January 25, 2012, Mr. Barrett submitted an expense report seeking reimbursement 
from the Firm for $123 .54 for a meal that he claimed was for business development. 
81. The receipt attached to the expense report showed that the meal was at a restaurant in Los 
Angeles, California, on January 5, 2012. 
82. The meal was charged to the credit card of Mr. Barrett's wife. 
83. The Firm reimbursed Mr. Barrett for the cost of the meal. 
84. The court docket shows that Mr. Barrett appeared in person in Wasatch County Justice 
Court at a pretrial conference on January 5, 2012. 
85. Mr. Barrett' s billing records show that he billed for 6.5 hours of work on January 5, 2012, 
and there are no references to a meeting or phone call with anyone in Los Angeles that day. 
86. The lunch guest never retained the Firm. 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT FROM TRIAL 
87. Mr. Barrett testified he discussed a legal issue with his wife's lunch guest over the phone 
and no evidence to the contrary was provided. 
88. The manner in which Mr. Barrett sought reimbursement was deceptive in that the 
information provided to the Firm gave no indication that Mr. Barrett was not actually at the lunch meeting 
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and was contrary, according to the testimony of Mr. Morris, to the infonnal understanding among the 
members of the Firm that a face-to-face meeting with a client was needed in order to be a legitimate 
business development cost which would be paid by the firm. 
General Facts 
89. The Policy at the firm from 2005 to 2011 required amounts above $4,000 which the 
partners wanted to write-off or write-down required Executive Committee approval. See Exhibit 58, Bates 
485. Mr. Barrett was a member of a committee at the Finn which would have given him knowledge of 
the threshold amount and Mr. Barrett was aware of a threshold amount. It was admitted by Mr. Morris, 
President of the Firm, this policy threshold level was not enforced and in January 2012 a new policy went 
into effect. 
90. Mr. Morris further testified there was no oversight by the Finn on costs and business 
development costs and it was the honor system that was in place amongst the attorneys. 
91. Mr. Morris testified it was the business expense reimbursement request fonn admitted as 
Ex. 56 page 236 which caused concern and led to further review of Mr. Barrett's cost requests. The 
concerns included the fact most of the dates on the request form were on a weekend and Item 3 was for 
skiing at Soldier Hollow, with the "entertained" or person with whom business development was done 
had Mr. Barrett's wife's family name of "Roegiers". Mr. Morris testified a further review by him and 
the Finn was done into the expenses and cost reimbursement request submitted by Mr. Barrett. This 
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review led to the discovery of the infonnation and issues of the California Meal reimbursement which 
became Count III of the complaint against Mr. Barrett. 
92. Mr. Morris testified all legal services perfonned by the attorneys at the Firm, belong to 
the Firm according to their employee contracts. No attorneys are allowed to do legal work outside the 
Firm. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court concludes as a matter of law that Mr. Barrett violated the following rules: 
WILLIAMS MA TIER 
93 . Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
94. Mr. Barrett engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit when he accepted 
payment directly from the client without the Finn's knowledge, thereby misappropriating $3,500 in legal 
fees that belonged to the Firm. 
95. Mr. Barrett further engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit when he wrote-
off bills that were due to the Firm in exchange for receiving construction services from Mr. Williams at 
his personal residence without the Firm's knowledge. 
96. By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, Mr. Barrett violated Rule 8.4(c). 
97. Mr. Barrett's violation of the rule with regard to the Williams matter was intentional and 
done with the intent to personally benefit himself. Mr. Barrett' s conduct resulted in hann to the Firm and 
the profession. 
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PETERSEN MATTER 
98. Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
99. Mr. Barrett engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit when he wrote-off bills 
that were due to the Firm in exchange for a shed constructed by Mr. Petersen at his personal residence 
without the Firm's knowledge. 
100. By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, Mr. Barrett violated Rule 8.4(c). 
101. Mr. Barrett's violation of the rule with regard to the Petersen matter was intentional and 
done with the intent to personally benefit himself. 
102. Mr. Barrett's conduct resulted in harm to the Firm and the profession. 
CALIFORNIA MATTER 
103. Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) states: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 
104. Mr. Barrett engaged in conduct involving dishonesty and deceit by seeking 
reimbursement for client development expenses for a meal in Los Angeles when, in fact, he was in Utah 
on that day attending to other matters. Mr. Barrett withheld information that would allow the Firm to 
properly evaluate whether the expense was legitimate. By engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and 
deceit, Mr. Barrett violated Rule 8.4(c). 
105. Mr. Barrett's conduct was intentional and done with the intent to benefit himself. 
106. Mr. Barrett's conduct resulted in harm to the Firm. 
• 
• 
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ORDER 
Because the Court finds that Mr. Barrett has violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the Court shall conduct a sanctions hearing. That hearing is set for March 3, 2015, at 1 :00 p.m. 
to 2:00 p.m., in Courtroom N41. 
Entered this 11th day of February, 2015 . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, to the following, this 11th day of February, 2015: 
Todd Wahlquist 
Deputy Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
opcfiling@utahbar.org 
George M. Haley 
J. Andrew Sjoblom 
Attorneys for Respondent 
222 S. Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
GMHaley@hollandhart.com 
JASjoblom@hollandhart.com 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR O 3 2015 
Si-\ir LAKE cou~ 
By: ________ .,.. __,;,,,,---e-
Deputy Clerk 
-----------------------------------
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE IBIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of: ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
CASE NO. 130907818 JOSEPH P. BARRETT #8088 
Respondent. 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
This matter came before the Court on March 2, 2015, for a Sanctions Hearing. The Office of 
Professional Conduct ("OPC") was represented by Todd Wahlquist. The Respondent, Joseph Barrett, 
was represented by George M. Haley. Testimony was given by various witnesses. The Court having 
considered the evidence, testimony, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented, finds and 
concludes as follows : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
On February 11, 2015, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
finding that Mr. Barrett had violated the following Rule of Professional Conduct on three occasions 
identified as the Williams matter, Petersen matter and the California matter: 
Violation of Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct) 
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct), Rules of Professional Conduct, provides as follows: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . 
Further, the above Findings and Conclusions are referred to and incorporated herein, with the 
Court now amending the signed findings by moving paragraph Nos. 33 and 52 from the section of 
stipulated findings to the section on additional findings of fact from trial by this reference. 
• 
• 
• 
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DISCIPLINE 
Based upon Mr. Barrett's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, a Sanctions Hearing 
was held on March 2, 2015. After hearing evidence and argument, the Court finds and concludes as 
follows: 
1. Mr. Barrett violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as outlined in the Findings and 
Conclusions. 
2. Mr. Barrett violated the Rules of Professional Conduct knowingly and intentionally. 
3. Mr. Barrett's conduct caused actual injury but the injured party has been made whole. 
4. The Court finds the following aggravating circumstances: 
a. Dishonest or selfish motive; 
b. Multiple offenses; 
c. Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct. 
5. The Court finds the following mitigating circumstances: 
a. Absence of a prior record; 
b. Restitution and efforts to rectify the consequences of the misconduct involved; 
c. Cooperation with the OPC throughout the proceedings; 
d. A partial understanding of actions he should have taken with his firm to avoid the 
problems. 
6. The Court does not find that client funds were taken and that disbarment is not mandated 
in this case. 
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7. Based upon all of the factors above and based upon the Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Discipline, the Court finds that a suspension from the practice of law for a period of time 
is the appropriate sanction for Mr. Barrett's misconduct. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that Joseph Barrett shall be suspended from the practice of law for a 
period of 150 days effective 30 days from the date of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Barrett shall comply with all requirements of Rule 14-526(a) 
of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Mr. Barrett shall pay costs incurred by the OPC in prosecuting this 
action. 
Dated this 3rd day of March, 2015. 
• 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of 
Suspension, to the following, this 3rd day of March, 2015: 
Todd Wahlquist 
Deputy Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
opcfiling@utahbar.org 
George M. Haley 
J. Andrew Sjoblom 
Attorneys for Respondent 
222 S. Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
GMHaiey@hollandhart.com 
J AS joblom@hol 1 andhart.com 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR_ 1,_,.2015 
SALT LAKE COUN~ 
By:-------=~....,!.Ll~.,_.. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of: 
JOSEPH P. BARRETT #8088 
Respondent. 
RULING GRANTING MOTION TO STAY 
CASE NO. 130907818 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
This matter came before the Court on March 11, 2015, pursaant to a Request to Submit on Mr. 
Barrett's Motion to Stay. No hearing was requested by the parties. The Court having reviewed the 
pleadings filed on this issue concludes as follows: 
On February 11, 2015, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
finding that Mr. Barrett had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct on three occasions identified as 
the Williams matter, the Petersen matter and the California matter. 
On March 2,2015, the Court imposed a sanction of suspension for 150 days within 30 days of the 
Order on Mr. Barrett. 
MOTION 
This matter was appealed by the Utah State Bar on March 5, 2015. Mr. Barrett requests a stay for 
several reasons, claiming there is not a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public and also cites 
the difficulties of winding down a legal practice and then having to do so again, if after appeal a more 
severe sanction is imposed. The Bar opposes the Motion on the basis that Mr. Barrett was dishonest and 
refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct and thus is likely to repeat his conduct. 
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DECISION 
The Court did not find previously the public was at a substantial threat or risk of irreparable harm 
nor does it do so now. While Mr. Barrett's conduct was not a one-time incident, the harm demonstrated 
was to his previous firm and not the general public or directly to a client. Further, full restitution was 
completed by Mr. Barrett. In addition, Mr. Barrett's conduct does not, nor did it impair or diminish his 
legal abilities or skills in the practice of law and thus potentially impacting the type of legal services 
received by clients. These same reasons also had some influence in the Court's imposing a suspension 
instead of disbarment. 
Further, Mr. Barrett did acknowledge he could have been more clear and communicative in his 
actions and conduct with his partners. 
Therefore, the Court, for the reasons set forth above, GRANTS the Motion. 
Dated this I~ of March, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/emailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling Granting 
Motion to Stay, to the following, this \~ay of March, 2015: 
Todd Wahlquist 
Deputy Senior Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
opcfiling@utahbar.org 
George M. Haley 
J. Andrew Sjoblom 
Attorneys for Respondent 
222 S. Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 IO 1 
GMHaley@hollandhart.com 
JASjoblom@hollandhart.com 
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU COMPENSATION POLICY 
The partn.ers of Snow, Christensen & Martineau recognize that no compensation system 
is accurate enough to be totally fair. It is impossible to quantify a partner's total contribution 
precisely in terms of monetary figures. 
We want to be as fair as possible, both as to the amount of compensation and the relative 
position of each partner's earnings to the others. We believe this philosophy will, over time, 
ensure that we have compensated partners fairly for their contribution to the firm. 
The compensation committee will discuss openly with each individual partner bow that 
partner's compensation for the coming year has been determined and how the relative 
compensation of partners generally was determined. There will be real and perceived mistakes. 
We encourage ~ery partner to ask appropriate questions. We wlll make every effort to explain 
perceived discrepancies. 
We will rewnrd total contribution, encow-nging each pnrtner to do the things that partner 
does best, in ways that partner does them best. We will encourage different styles. While we 
want to give individual practitioners as much autonomy ns possible in managing their individual 
practices, we will expect partners to do that within the administrative and management structures 
the fum has implemented to meet economic· goals. 
We will strive for market levels of compensation. However, we recognize thnt available 
funds will dictate our ability to reach market 
-------. 
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Our goal is not to become a sweat shop, h.owevec, we recognize that because of our size, 
we must expect each partner to make a minimum contribution to the finn's overall economic 
success. 
Our compensation committee wiII do what is reasonably needed in order to be nware of 
each partner's contribution. 
We must reward those activities that are crucial for the survival and future of our ftnn, 
and must penalize those activities that are destructive. 
The application of our compensation philosophy requires trust, good faith end equity over 
the long run. 
Our compensation criteria are as follows: 
A. Client Origination 
Contribution to origination and development of new clients, and new kinds of work from 
existing clients, must be recognized and rewarded. Obtaining new business is crllicnl to the 
firm's continued well-being and growth. This particularly is true in the highly competitive 
market 
B. Client Retention 
Additional business from. existing clients, often the result of quality work satisfactorily 
perfo1med by members other than the originating purtner, is critical to the finn's continued 
well-being and growth. This particularly is true in today's highly competitive market We 
recognize the need to "credit" those attorneys responsibie for maintaining and continuing good 
and positive relntions with existing clients. Perfom1ance of quality work and maintenance of 
• 
• 
• 
000437 
• 
solid relationshi,ps with clients go a long way in securing the reputation and influence of 
11raiamalcers." This trait cannot be measured in objective terms only, since it is lmpossible in 
many cases to know exactly what or who was pivotal in expanding existing client business .. 
C. Quality of Work Product and Timeliness 
We recognize general efficiency, effort, diligence, competence, dependability and 
timeliness in handling work, either of a chargeable, firm management or business development 
nature. "Quality" includes knowledge of applicable Jaw, imagination, creativity and ·innovation. 
ability to write clearly and persuasively, ability to analyze quickly and accuratelyj good 
judgment, the ability to plan and implemenflegal strategics, oral communication skills, the 
ability to handle the unexpected, the ability to negotiate, and the ability to handle complex 
matters. 
A partner must be wHiing to delegate work horizontally or vertically to the appropriate 
expertise or level of competence to ensure that work is done well, when it is promised to the 
client, and .within deadlines provided by law. 
D. Partner Productivity 
Wr; recognize that defining the productivity of an attorney js more complex tl).an simply 
looking ·at computer numbers. Productivity includes hours the partner vlorks, the efficiency with 
which the work is handled, the payment risk of the work performed, th_e timeliness of collections, 
the extent to which that par:tner properly utilizes other attorneys.and other furn resources. and 
ass'ists others with their productivity, nnd the extent to which the partner collects costs directly 
spent to tl1e advantnge of clients. 
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E. Seniority 
We recognize the importance and value of tenure and seniority within the firm. A 
lnwyer's value to the finn over the years and long-term contribution to finn growth and success 
cannot be overlooked. 
Seniority is not age alone, nor is it only the number of years a lawyer bas been with the 
firm. Rather, it means the number of years the partner has spent developing and maintaining 
cUents for the benefit of aJI, building arid enhancing the finn's reputation, and participating in the 
training aod development of young lawyers. 
F. Finn Management and Leadership 
Contribution to firm management, incl~ding efficiency nnd effectiveness in handling 
management assignments, is critical to the firm's future and must be recognized. Our long-range 
success depends upon the skill and success of those people involved, Management responsibility 
in the fian includes practice management, recruiting, marketing, committee assignments, etc. A 
partner involved in firm management responsibilities must treat that work with the sEI.D'le skill and 
attention devoted to client work. 
G. Complinnce with Firm Policies 
We recognize willingness to abide by the policies of the firm. This includes: 
1. Abiding by policies to keep tlme accurately, to tum in time sheets promptly, to 
follow policy on billings, collections. etc. 
2. Turning over client management and olbcr controls lo other lawyers when 
appropriate and to the ex.tent appropriate. 
000439 
3. Contributing to the equitable and efficient distribution of work assignments and 
client contacts. 
4. Specializing and developing expertise in particular areas to complement other 
abilities in the £inn. 
H. Persono.l Relationships and Teamwork; 
Practicing a team concept, including participation in, and cooperation on, finn 
committees, etc. is expected. Client srui.ring, client introductions, 1111d overall promotion of 
harmony and goodwill among finn members is critical and absolutely expected. These include: 
1. Maintaining good working relationships wilh both legal and non-legal personnel. 
2. 
3. 
good faith. 
Lending personal support and enthusinsm to nil personnel. 
Respecting each lawyer's professional reputation, management judgments and 
4. Respecting others' contrasting views and respecting each partner as a person. 
5. Promoting and cross-selling other firm lawyers. 
I. Pnrtner'Participation in Finn Activities and Functlons: 
Partners are obligated to attend firm socinl and professional meetings. Partners a.re 
obligated to participate in those management decisions and activities which appropriately fall 
upon partners. 
J. Lawyer Development 8..1\d Delegation of Work 
Time and effort in working with younger lnwyers to increase their professional skills 
must be recognized. This includes the training and development of associalcs and paralegals. 
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K. Professional and Community Activities 
Contributions that enhance the fum's image and prestige through maintaining good 
relations with oth~r lawyel"Si spe~ing at CLE progr~ms, publishing, partjcipating in bar 
aotivities1 !ind assuming bar and cotrununity leadership positions must be recognized. 
We acknowledge the imporiance of being visible in civic and/or charitable matters in the 
community and within the bar, because it's the right thing to do, it assists in developing new 
work, and assists in fostering leadership t:rai.oing for young lawyers, However, these activities 
should be perfonned with the knowledge and uapproval1' of partners . 
• 
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Utah Constitution 
Article VIII, Section 4 [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court -- Judges pro tempore --
Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the 
state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules of • 
Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members 
of both houses of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme 
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any 
judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, 
including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law. 
• 
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RULE 2.9 
Ex Parte Communications 
(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications, or consider other communications made to the judge 
outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending* 
or impending matter,* except as follows: 
(1) When circumstances require it, ex parte communication for 
scheduling, administrative, or emergency purposes, which does not 
address substantive matters, is permitted, provided: 
(a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, 
substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte 
communication; and 
(b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the 
substance of the ex parte communication and gives the parties an 
opportunity to respond. 
(2) A judge may obtain the written advice of a disinterested expert on the 
law* applicable to a proceeding before the judge, if the judge gives advance 
notice to the parties of the person to be consulted and the subject matter of 
the advice to be solicited and affords the parties a reasonable opportunity 
to object and respond to the notice and to the advice received. 
(3) A judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose 
functions are to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative 
responsibilities, or with other judges, provided the judge makes reasonable 
efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record 
and does not abrogate the responsibility to personally decide the matter. 
(4) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with 
the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before th 
e judge. 
(5) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communication 
when expressly authorized by law to do so. 
(B) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte 
communication bearing upon the substance of a matter, the judge shall 
make provision promptly to notify the parties of the substance of the 
communication and provide the parties with an opportunity to respond. 
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(C) A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and 
shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly 
be judicially noticed. 
(D) A judge shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the judge does 
not receive inappropriate ex parte communications through or from court 
staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control. 
COMMENT 
[1] To the extent reasonably possible, all parties or their lawyers shall be 
included in communications with a judge. 
[2] Whenever the presence of a party or notice to a party is required by this 
Rule, it is the party's lawyer, or if the party is unrepresented, the party, who is to 
be present or to whom notice is to be given. 
[3] The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes 
communications with lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not 
participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted by this Rule. 
[4] A judge may initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications expressly 
authorized by law, such as when serving on therapeutic or problem-solving 
courts, mental health courts, or drug courts. In this capacity, judges may assume 
a more interactive role with parties, treatment providers, probation officers, social 
workers, and others. 
[5] A judge may consult with other judges on pending matters, but must avoid 
ex parte discussions of a case with judges who have previously been disqualified 
from hearing the matter, and with judges who have appellate jurisdiction over the 
matter. 
[6] The prohibition against a judge investigating the facts in a matter extends to 
information available in all mediums, including electronic. 
[7] A judge may consult ethics advisory committees, outside counsel, or legal 
experts concerning the judge's compliance with this Code. Such consultations are 
not subject to the restrictions of paragraph (A)(2). 
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